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The Accounting Profession in the 1980's—
Some SEC Perspectives
George C. Mead
Securities and Exchange Commission*

I am very pleased to respond to Howard Stettler's invitation to speak on the
topic, as Howard put it, "the SEC's position regarding the accounting profession
in 1985." Of course, the response cannot be direct. The Commission has no
such "master plan," nor does it desire one, nor would such preconception be
wise in these fast-evolving times.
However, there are some themes in the actions of the Commission and in the
words of Chairman Williams and other SEC spokesmen which are indicative of the
Commission's general expectations of and concerns about the profession in the
1980's. There are in my view two underlying themes. The Commission is
sincerely committed to the policy of self-regulation by the profession; it is also
committed to "active oversight" of the profession. These seemingly contradictory statements will come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the Commission's activities and annual reports to Congress, or who follows its relationships
with the A S B , F A S B , and the SECPS and its Public Oversight Board.
Unfortunately, to base very specific predictions about the profession in the
80's on these two features of the present climate would be questionable, even if
the prevailing economic and social winds hold steady. Nevertheless, I believe we
can take these two themes—that the profession is and should be and will remain a
profession and that the SEC will continue its oversight role in helping interpret
that which is reasonable in various public expectations for accounting and for
business in general—second, add some observations about the climate in which
we all operate, and then add some comments on certain areas where change is
now occurring or is perceived as necessary—and from all this gain some feeling for
the Commission's hopes for the accounting profession in this new decade.

The Environment—Economic, Social, Legal, Professional
Let me turn now to some comments about the environment in which we find
ourselves. First, economic: the combination of inflation, recession, and questionable energy supplies have made the public much more conscious of economic
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publications by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the
Commission.
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matters—and of economic measurements. The amounts, sources, and uses of corporate profits (and losses) are often front-page news, and debate as to the proper
measurement thereof is, appropriately, no longer left solely to accountants. Some
major unexpected failures, of both corporations and municipalities, have also
underscored the importance of accounting and in some cases have led to questioning of the auditors' responsibilities.
Second, the social environment: questions of "to whom and for what ends is
the corporation accountable'' are heard regularly. Widespread disclosures of questionable payments and illegal acts, and some glaring instances of fraud, have contributed to this, as have increasing concerns for the physical environment and
relations with employees, customers, and so forth. Changing views on corporate
accountability do—and should—affect the role of the auditor.
Third, the legal environment: this litigious era makes both business and the
profession understandably cautious in responding to economic and social changes.
Thus, where voluntary efforts such as disclosure of (and the C P A ' s review of) soft
data may seem appropriately responsive, there is timidity—which only augments
normal human inertia. Where standards or regulations have been promulgated,
too frequently it is their letter rather than their spirit which is heeded. The interest of Congress in accounting, as shown in the oil and gas legislation, the
F C P A , and the Metcalf-Moss-Eagleton Committees' scrutiny of the profession,
may be flattering in some ways but also invites legalistically defensive attitudes.
Thus the profession, and with it the Commission, finds itself in a climate of
conflicting and changing views on corporate accountability and the related roles of
accounting data and the audit function. It is also a time of impatience with
consensus-building. "Leadership"—usually and often necessarily translated,
"rule-writing"—is expected of the profession and/or the Commission. Surely the
"pronouncement explosion" of the 1970's will continue in this decade, given
the economic, social and legal factors at hand.
One other factor should be noted. Accountants seem to be changing. It is
becoming easier for many practitioners to speak of the "accounting industry'' or
"business" rather than "the profession." Consulting services are often viewed
as not only an audit client service but as the major area of real growth opportunity, in a profession obsessed by growth. Clearly, there is business justification—
the profession must remain economically and intellectually attractive to retain its
talent. Nevertheless, Professor Briloff is not the only party concerned with
whether the growth of the aggressive consultant mentality may be affecting the
"typical auditor."
So this is the environment and the profession which is our concern tonight.
T o reiterate my themes, one, the SEC hopes and expects the profession to be just
that—a profession—in the 8 0 s and beyond. That is:
•
•
•

to respond first to the public interest, however that is reasonably
interpreted.
to practice, as firms and as individuals, in the spirit as well as the letter
of articulations of the public interest.
to maintain, as the organized profession, public confidence through
credible self-regulation.

A t the same time, (theme two) the Commission will continue to play an active
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and visible oversight role to ensure that the private sector exercises initiative in a
timely and effective manner.

Some Developing Areas
I would like to turn now to a few developing areas, which I believe serve to illustrate the profession's changing environment and the present course of private
and public standard-setting. These are:
1) "supplementary data'' and limited reviews thereof;
2) corporate accountability, including governance structure and the
specific case of internal accounting control reports;
3) a corollary to items one and two, the "auditor of record" or
continuous audit concept; and,
4) professional self-regulation.

Supplementary Data/Limited Reviews
The era of "soft information" is rather rapidly evolving upon us. Inflationadjusted numbers, forward-looking data, management's analyses and policy
statements—these are ideas whose time, perhaps with a push from our inflationary economy, has come. The profession is facing the additional challenge of
increasing expectations regarding its role in the broader area of financial reporting. A significant response has been the A I C P A ' s designation of the F A S B as the
authoritative source of standards for disclosure of information outside the confines
of the financial statements. The Board's Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 specifies this broader view; Statement No. 33, "Financial Reporting
and Changing Prices," requires supplementary, non-statement disclosures.
The SEC's contributions have included the A S R No. 190 "replacement
cost'' disclosures (now rescinded), R R A (the reporting of valuations of proved oil
and gas reserves), and various inducements to disclose forward-looking information. Currently outstanding is a set of proposals—the so-called "integration project.'' While this project has many facets, a very significant aspect is one portion of
the proposed 10-K amendment. This would change the focus of "management's
discussion and analysis'' and certain five-year summary data items to elicit meaningful information on three financial aspects: liquidity, capital resources and
results of operations. Narrative discussion of the effects of inflation on the business
entity would also be called for—even if the company is not required to present the
supplementary information required by F A S B Statement No. 33. Not coincidentally, the proposals would provide management with the opportunity to present
more forward-looking information.
In general, the primacy of the basic annual financial statements as the focus of
reporting activity and thus of auditor attention is being eroded. Disclosures of
breakdowns of historical data, such as quarterly and business segment information, have also caused rethinking of the costs and benefits of various levels of audit
assurance.
Happily, the Commission has demonstrated faith in the ability of auditors to
add credibility to management's disclosures, even if the degree is less than that
presumed in the standard audit of historical cost financial statements. It seems
beyond question that means will be devised for explicit reporting by auditors on
supplementary, nonfinancial statement, disclosures.
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There are, of course, many problems (or more positively, challenging matters)
to resolve. Many of the disclosure standards are new, some seem vague, many remain to be articulated. The same is true of developing limited review standards.
There are obvious costs, unmeasurable benefits, and client opposition. A n d there
are uncharted responsibilities, that is, liabilities.
SAS No. 27 is a positive step (and not the first one). However (to quote Chairman Williams):
I am concerned that present standards do not require that auditors report
on the nature and results of their reviews of supplementary information.
Reporting the nature of the auditor's procedures and how they differ from
an audit would provide an important communicating channel between the
profession and the users of financial statements.
1

The Auditing Standards Board is understandably quite sensitive to the liability
implications of explicit limited assurances. It is probably fair to concede that
definitive answers will come only from testing before the courts. Nevertheless, the
Commission is aware of the complex issue of auditor liability. It has acted, and is
contemplating further action, to defuse some of the more serious liability obstacles
(though it does not wish to remove all auditor responsibility).
In June 1979, the Commission adopted a safe harbor rule offering certain protection from liability where forward-looking information, along with related
assumptions, is disclosed or reaffirmed in SEC filings (under both the 1933 and
1934 Acts) or annual reports to shareholders. This includes projections of financial items, statements of management plans and objectives, and management
discussion and analysis items which concern future economic performance. In addition, the Commission has proposed to extend safe harbor to certain supplementary information dealing with the effects of changing prices and with oil and gas
reserve information.
The Commission has also taken action relating specifically to the liability of
auditors under Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act for their reports on supplementary
information as to changing prices and oil and gas reserves, if such reports are required. A s you may be aware, Section 11(a) imposes liability on an accountant for
misstatements or omissions of material facts in a registration statement which includes his report, unless he had, after "reasonable investigation," grounds to
believe that the information was true. The problem raised by this standard, of
course, is that limited reviews contemplated by the Auditing Standards Board do
not afford the auditor a sufficient basis to judge the " t r u t h " of the supplemental
data reviewed. The proposed rule amendments are similar to the Commission's
recent action in ASR No. 274, the effect of which is to exclude reports by auditors
on unaudited interim information (which under SAS No. 24 are based on review
procedures less than an audit) from potential liability under Sections 7 and 11 of
the Securities Act.
However appropriate these precedents may be, they still a) represent an item
by item approach rather than a general position on soft data and b) do not fully
clarify the auditor-reviewer's legal responsibility under the securities acts. T o
again quote Chairman Williams:
There are some who assert—and I might add, fairly persuasively—that accountants should not be given a blanket exemption of this sort from liabil150

ity under Section 11(a). Thus, I anticipate that the Commission may, in
the near future, request comments on alternative approaches to the issue.
The result of that process could be liability for failure to comply with the
applicable professional standards.
In any case, I fully expect that the liability question soon will be clarified
and that requirements for accountants' reports expressing limited
assurances on the basis of reviews of supplementary information will be
resolved. This process reflects the Commission's belief—similar to that
suggested by the Hochfelder decision—that there must be a fair and
reasonable balance between, on one side, the need to ensure responsible
auditing services, and, on the other, the burdens and liabilities placed on
the accounting profession.
2

The growing importance of non-financial statement disclosures, both "soft"
and analytical, and auditor association therewith, provides a clear example of the
twin themes of this address—the SEC and the profession in tension—a creative
tension. The Commission has provided much of the impetus for interims,
forward-looking data, and inflation adjusted data, and is continuing to do so with
the proposed expansion of management's discussion and analysis. The profession's standard-setting bodies have contributed significantly in guiding the implementation of these initiatives.
Supplemental data also provides an example of the frustrating problem of compliance with the letter rather than the spirit of standards. The proposed management discussion is a good illustration. The existing guidelines have become laden
with all manner of interpretations and materiality policies; too frequently, the
discussion is a bare recounting of the most obvious. The proposal attempts to
elicit more meaningful disclosure by being purposefully indefinite; at one point it
says, in effect, "tell investors about your liquidity and capital structure."
However, many commentators have complained about this lack of specificity. For
reasons both mean and defensive (legally), there is great reluctance to exercise professional judgment in interpreting and enforcing the spirit or intent of standards
and regulations.
This pervasive professional problem is also illustrated by the current reconsideration of the term "fairly presents" in the standard audit report. The
Auditing Standards Board is presently considering some significant changes in
that report, one of which would substitute " i n accordance with G A A P appropriate in the circumstances" for " f a i r . " The Office of the Chief Accountant is not
especially supportive of this, despite the Cohen Commission recommendation,
though it would feel more comfortable if more discussion of "appropriateness'' or
"preferability of measurement and disclosure choices" were provided (either by
the A S B or FASB). In any event, "fairness"—the judgment of management and
the auditor as to overall impressions conveyed—cannot be avoided. The Securities
Acts and the courts demand disclosure which is "not misleading."
This "fairness-preferability-spirit of the standard" area is admittedly difficult.
A n d as we move further from the anchor of the financial statements and experience a proliferation of "bottom lines," "fairness" is becoming even more
amorphous. Still, the public expects disclosure of substance rather than mere compliance with rules, and one way or another this demand will be served.
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Corporate Accountability
A n y discussion of the profession in the coming years should pay some heed to
changing popular expectations about business corporations and their management. Auditors certainly are affected by what a company " i s for" and how it is
governed. Clearly, more is being expected of the auditor's role than a blessing of
profit measures. That evolving role, only one of several in the broader context of
corporate accountability, is not, and cannot, be entirely self-defined by the profession.
There are two related areas here—for what should corporations be accountable and by means of what formal structure (that is, the corporate governance
issue).

Corporate Objectives
A s to basic corporate objectives beyond creation of value (or cash) for investors, we are all aware of the "social responsibility" school of thought. Where
environmental and social concerns have been enacted into law, there are generally
avenues of information and enforcement that do not involve the SEC or at present
involve auditors. Yet, it is not inconceivable that the independent auditor could
become involved in some of these matters, for example, as a result of calls for expanded "social disclosures" for the benefit of those investors who are not totally
economically motivated. Even assuming that formal reporting will retain a
primarily financial orientation, F A S No. 5 may be more broadly interpreted in
disclosures of "social costs." A related example is the Commission's presently
required disclosure of contingent future environmental costs including costs of
litigation, and its policy, recently clarified in the interpretative release issued concurrently with the settlement of proceedings involving U.S. Steel, which states
that disclosure may be necessary " . . . to prevent . . . financial statements [etc.]
. . . from being misleading . . . if a corporation has a policy or approach toward
compliance with environmental regulations which is reasonably likely to result in
substantial fines [or] penalties. . . "
Another "accountable for what'' area is that of illegal acts by or on behalf of
the corporation. The general, though simplistic, assumption is that companies
should operate within the law, and that the corporate governance structure should
deter illegal acts. However, many matters of definition and implementation remain unsettled. These include questions of whom should be informed of such
acts—top management, the board of directors, the public—and on what basis of
evidence and concept of materiality.
3

Turning to "irregularities," the Cohen Commission Report contained certain
"recommendations . . . intended to add to the substance of the standard of care
for fraud detection." Some of these recommendations already have been acted
upon (note SAS No. 22—"Planning and Supervision," SAS No. 23—
"Analytical Review Procedures," and Statement on Quality Control Standards
No. 1). The continuing and considerable private sector initiatives (as evidenced by
three of the papers at this Conference), along with increased involvement by directors, may yet provide realistic and responsive answers to these very difficult questions of disclosure and auditor responsibility regarding irregularities and illegal
acts. In any event, neither the Commission nor the profession acts in a vacuum
regarding these issues of business philosophy and law.
4
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There is, of course, agreement that management has certain stewardship
responsibilities. A n d the current "big issue'' in this area is the report by management on the state of its internal accounting control. A s you know, the Commission's proposed rule would have required such a report, accompanied by the
auditor's comment thereon. The proposal was recently withdrawn, although
"tabled" more accurately describes the Commission's action for it retains a very
active interest in the matter.
Such a report is not mandated by the F C P A , nor was the Commission's purpose in its proposal a direct result of the accounting provisions of the Act. Rather,
the Commission believes that reports on control systems provide information
useful to investors in general but more specifically to the company's present
shareholders—information for its own sake as a partial indicator of their management's performance of stewardship responsibilities as well as having implications
for the quality of unaudited public information. In addition, it is my personal belief
that I A C reports may be related to the same perceptions of public concern for
American corporate conduct that underlay the F C P A legislation.
There are, obviously, some very substantive and unresolved questions of
definition and liability. It should be emphasized though, that the Commission has
not dismissed internal control reports. Chairman Williams' words nicely summarize its position in withdrawing the proposal:
I am receptive to arguments that private sector initiatives, such as that
proposed by the Financial Executives Institute and by various public accounting firms, should be given the opportunity to work. The Commission, of course, is watching developments on this subject with interest,
and, where these initiatives conform to the objectives of the new Act, will
take them into account in determining its course of action.
5

It seems obvious that the accounting provisions of the Act have significant implications and that management statements on internal control are becoming a
reality, whether in the long run they are molded by individual firms' initiatives,
guided by private sector standards, SEC-mandated, or some combination thereof.

Accountability Mechanisms
Let us move now from the "for what" to the " h o w " of corporate
accountability—mechanisms for corporate governance and possible effects on the
auditor's role therein.
The modern corporation is an extraordinarily complex system in which,
among others, managers, directors, lawyers and auditors (both internal and independent) play important roles. In combination, their often subtle interrelationships determine the quality of corporate accountability. In this system, the audit
function, both directly, and indirectly by monitoring other controls, advances the
corporate accountability process and influences the corporation's financial
discipline.
Both formal corporate structure and shareholder participation are involved
here. A s to developments in the area of structure:
•

Corporate boards which are more independent of management and
more involved in the company's affairs.
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The SEC supports this movement through moral suasion, through ordered settlements of enforcement actions, and implicitly by inclusion of relevant
disclosures in proxy information. A s this trend develops, the profession has a
significant opportunity in helping to meet corporate directors' information needs.
I recommend " T h e Strategic A u d i t , " a recent Journal of Accountancy article,
for some interesting observations in this regard.
6

•

Audit committees

There is no need to recount the perceived importance of functional audit committees for auditors, internal and external, and for corporate accountability structure
in general. A large majority of public companies have them; they are a New York
Stock Exchange listing requirement. Also, certain companies have consented to
audit committees, with defined membership and duties, as a feature of their settlements of SEC enforcement proceedings.
•

Corporate legal counsel

The American Bar Association is reconsidering the matter of whether "the corporation," its board, its shareholders, or the management is the attorney's client.
There is a theory that an attorney, who knows of actions (actual or contemplated)
of management which because of their questionable legality could be detrimental
to the company, has a duty to demand that management apprise the board, if not
"the public" as well. If this view prevails, there could be implications for
auditors—for example, attorney-CPA communication may be facilitated.
•

Formal Codes of Management Ethics

The Cohen Commission, among others, has advocated that management disclose
the existence and monitoring of such a code and that the auditor opine on that
assertion. The implementation and publicizing of such reform measures could
well improve the public's image of business. The private sector—the profession,
but more fundamentally the business community—has an opportunity for initiative.
Turning briefly to shareholder democracy, here the activities range from the
fundamental to the more evolutionary. The "Corporate Democracy Act of
1980," recently introduced in the House of Representatives, would require
among other things "constituency boards of directors," expanded disclosures,
and "community impact analyses" in connection with plant closings. If this, or
some of the other more radical of the legislative proposals were to pass, there
would surely be major and unpredictable effects on business in general, and on the
profession and perhaps the structure of accounting theory, as well. More procedural is the "corporate accountability project" of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance. While this study could result in proposed proxy rule amendments, it seems doubtful that such proposals will involve extension of the responsibilities of independent auditors.
In summary, the corporate governance area is perhaps a better example of the
profession's opportunity for constructive response than for initiative. Accountants are rather ill-positioned to initiate changes, but can, must, and are, adapting
to whatever evolves.
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Auditors—both outside auditors and internal auditors—are major contributors to the effective corporate accountability process which is an alternative to further governmental intrusions into the private sector's
decision-making process.
7

"Auditor-of-Record" Concept
The audit should be considered a function to be performed during a period
of time, rather than an audit of a particular set of financial statements . . .
(It) should expand to include all important elements of the financial reporting process.
8

Thus did the Cohen Commission advocate the continuous auditing or auditor-ofrecord concept. This was in a context which included regular association with interim reports and evaluation of the full period's internal accounting control. A s
financial reporting expands and the corporate governance structure evolves—also,
as basic audit approaches and techniques become less seasonal—it seems to be a
natural development.
This is, it seems to me, the expectation of the Commission. The SEC is interested in and favors the concept. There were, of course, the actions of a few
years ago which involved auditors in quarterly data. I believe it is fair to say that at
present the staff posture is to encourage continued private sector initiatives regarding quarterly reviews and, by implication, further formalization of the
auditor-of-record status.

Professional Self-Regulation
The new SEC Practice Section-Public Oversight Board structure provides the
most vivid example of the clash and cooperation between the profession and the
public sector in responding to the impetus of public expectations. The structure,
still very much in the development and testing stage, is complex and subtle. The
chain runs from the firm's own quality control mechanisms, to peer reviews of the
firm by the SECPS, to POB monitoring of those reviews, to the SEC—whose oversight activity will be heavily influenced by the Commission's evaluation of the effectiveness of the P O B as an overseer of the profession's self-regulatory program.
The peer review program is the centerpiece. If carried out meaningfully and if
coupled with effective disciplinary procedures, the profession will have implemented a significant, though expensive and difficult, change. The effectiveness
of this new program is understandably not yet resolved. The Commission hopes
ultimately to be able to rely heavily on the POB's monitoring. However, it is still
felt necessary for the SEC staff to have sufficient access to peer review workpapers
to permit an overall evaluation of the reviews themselves and of the Board's
supervision, both for the Commission's own satisfaction and so that it may report
credibly to Congress.
The difficulty in arriving at a mutually acceptable arrangement here is only in
part due to technical or jurisdictional problems. More fundamentally, it reflects
the profession's fears on the one hand (for example, that the Commission would
use access to detailed documents to institute proceedings against firms) and on the
other hand the SEC's need to assure integrity of the process (while not wanting its
involvement to include a "blanket pardon''). There is probably no better example
155

of the need for regulator and professional statesmanship than the continuing "access" negotiations.
The major issue of disciplinary " c l o u t " also is progressing. Last November,
the SECPS established a "Special Investigations Committee'' and set forth Rules
of Procedures for the Imposition of Sanctions. It remains to be seen whether the
Section can complement and perhaps even obviate some of the SEC's enforcement
work by invoking discipline which is both constructive and credible—or whether
this function de facto will remain primarily with the Commission. Obviously, it is
a "sticky" matter.
The Public Oversight Board, composed of distinguished members of the
public, occupies a unique position as the "go between" in the regulatoryprofessional nexus.
The P O B must be sufficiently detached from the accounting profession to
guide the effort objectively and to ensure that the profession does not lose
sight of the goals which it must achieve. While the Board's authority is advisory only, it can and should—by virtue of its stature—serve as a conscience, critic and leader. But it is not yet clear whether the POB is
prepared to assume this responsibility.
9

One matter underlying this less than ringing endorsement is the Commission's position on the "scope of services" issue, which differs at least in emphasis
from that of the P O B , and indeed it seems from much of the profession. Audit independence vs. consulting is, of course, an especially vexing matter, for it is intrinsically a question primarily of attitudes rather than hard evidence. ASR Nos. 250
and 264 have been severely criticized as being too threatening and vague in attacking an allegedly non-existent problem. The Commission, as you know, felt
the POB and the profession to be "not adequately sensitized" to public perceptions. But it is reluctant to go beyond mandating disclosure of fees and directors'
approvals at this point—instead, it much prefers that the profession grapple with
the "scope" issue.
One major feature of ASR No. 264 is the so-called "global test"—that is, an
expression of the Commission's general concern that auditing firms be primarily
in the practice of auditing. The philosophy of A S R No. 264 is that while there is
generally no current problem, the profession should be alert to the potential, given
the increasing importance and scope of consulting services.
ASR No. 264 is indeed vague, but would more detailed rules be more
realistic? Let us consider three example situations, the latter two hypothetical:
•
•
•

the 10% audit, 90% tax-writeup-consulting firm
a management consulting firm, which forms or acquires an auditing
subsidiary
a C P A firm, where a majority of its billings and executive partners are
non-accounting-related

In any of these is actual audit quality necessarily impaired? Is even the probability
of impairment higher? How will such firms—and indirectly the whole auditing
profession—be perceived? How would the Commission view firms two or three
(especially if either has been given a "clean'' peer review)? It is frustrating that
none of these questions have clear answers. However, resort to detailed rules and
156

proscriptions would surely be more form than substance, i.e., give comfort (to
firms, to the public, even to the SEC) that could be illusory.
Hopefully, the "veiled threats" of ASR No. 264 (as some characterize them)
and "sensitivity" on the part of firms and the SECPS will be sufficient to avoid
cases of actual impairment of audit quality, the bottom line, as well as of a firm's
professional image.
Conclusion
What generalizations can be made about the SEC's "perspectives" for the
'80s, for the profession and itself? What are its hopes and expectations?
A s to the profession, the 1980's would appear to be a time of digesting the
truly significant developments of the 1970's—soft data, limited reviews, audit
committees, peer reviews, internal accounting control, the Cohen Commission
Report, as major examples. A great deal of experimentation and definition remain,
but the profession has broken ground in several ways to enhance its role in corporate accountability. It must, and I believe it will, now
. . . guard against the tendency to become complacent, or to develop an attitude that enough, or too much, has already been done—or that much of
what is being done is not substantively necessary or cost justifiable, but
rather a mandatory tithe to keep powerful but misguided external forces at
bay.
10

The Commission is certainly not eager to formally regulate the profession or
to set accounting and auditing standards. Dealing with practical impediments to
broader societal purposes, which cannot be brushed aside as mere nuisances, is a
clear role for the profession. The private sector will continue to be relied on to
develop new ideas regarding disclosure, audit technique, and even audit purpose,
and to aid the implementation of those initiatives which the Commission may feel
to be necessary—and to take some of the grief that comes with new standards.
Further, in Clarence Sampson's words: "It is inherent that professionals are more
likely to respond in a professional manner when enforcing their own standards
than when complying with rules imposed by government."
11

Turning to the Commission, it too needs to be sensitive and practicable—and I
believe is generally demonstrating these qualities. It will surely continue to occupy a dominant role in interpreting public expectations. This seems inevitable
because of the SEC's mandate under the securities laws, its "broader-than- accounting" function in corporate accountability, and, relative to private sector
standards bodies, its capacity to act. There is no desire to preempt the FASB,
A S B , P O B , etc., but rather, as an overseer, to assure that standards adopted fall
with a range of acceptable solutions.
The profession has understandable limits on its ability to undertake major initiatives. However, it is in a quasi-public role—not conscripted into involuntary
service in a dangerous mission, but it has nevertheless enlisted in a public service,
under a franchise based on the securities laws of 1933 and 1934. A s such, the
profession with the Commission must heed and interpret reasonable public expectations.
If only we could predict those expectations (or even agree on what is reasonable today), we could perhaps venture more definitive predictions for the profes157

sion. But that is difficult. A l l anyone can say about "the Commission's plan for
the ' 8 0 s " is an expectation that in tandem—in constructive tension—the profession and the SEC will enhance the usefulness, and the concomitant responsibilities
and prestige, of the accounting and auditing functions.
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